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ABSTRACT
Veriﬁcation of complex distributed systems is a chal-
lenging task. There is a number of approaches, based
on the correctness by design concept, involving code
generation. However such approaches are not always
feasible. On the other side embedded systems incor-
porate distributed multitasking systems are hard to be
veriﬁed by code analysis alone. In our approach we
combine automated code level analysis with high level
modeling of selected hardware mechanisms. The ﬁt-
ness of the approach is demonstrated by checking a
number of critical properties in a custom embedded real
time operating system (eRTOS) for a high performance
32-Bit digital signal processor.
1. INTRODUCTION
Embedded systems are continuously growing in perfor-
mance, which often adds complexity and the demand to
integrate more features and functionality. Even small
systems use multitasking systems or networking capa-
bilities. This results in a growing complexity and a
growing uncertainty during development. A well de-
ﬁned development cycle and model based development
can help to cope with this complexity, however in some
situation such an approach is not feasible, e.g. if an ex-
isting system needs to be extended. Here approaches
are necessary, which aid the developer to detect faults,
or at least suggest on problematic parts.
In a recent project we developed a custom real time
operating system with basic features according to mul-
titasking, driver management and so on. Due to the
growing demand on computing power the system was
extended to a multiprocessor platform. The growing
complexity led to spontaneous faults, which were hard
to detect.
This led to the idea to make a case study about the
ﬁtness of existing veriﬁcation methods. Model check-
ing methods[1] can be applied automatically, if the re-
quired properties are well known. However, there are
two main problems: How to transform existing code
into a model checking problem? How to recognize the
concurrency in terms of tasks and interrupt functions
used in the embedded system? Thus we decided to
close the gap with an appropriate method.
Some general restrictions apply to statical analysis
of software (source code) in terms of automatic, formal
veriﬁcation, due to combinatorial growing of the state
space. The state space of software grows exponential
to program size and number of tasks, see section 2.7.
Thus we need to restrict on states required for describ-
ing interaction between tasks, interrupts and operating
system. This leads to a property preserving abstraction
of the analyzed system.
In section 2 the prerequisites for our approach and
the used models are described. Section 3 describes im-
plementation issues and experimental results. In the
ﬁnal section 4 we give an outlook to future work.
2. MODELING
This section describes the process for deriving imple-
mentation models from implementation source code.
First some prerequisites are stated, on which the work
relies. Thereafter the used models, and algorithms are
described.
2.1. Prerequisites
The modeling concepts are based on some prerequi-
sites, in terms of coding guidelines, relating the source
code.
1. Functions must not be recursively implemented.
2. Pointers to Functions (Callback Functions) are
not allowed, because data dependencies cannot
be (easily) resolved by static code analysis.
3. Data structures for task synchronization (Mutex)
must be global, to be available or static code
analysis.
4. Assembler functions should contain exactly one
return statement, for easier parsing of source
code.
5. All tasks must be a priory known and should re-
side during runtime.
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Prerequisite 1 is a general coding guideline (at least
for embedded systems) to avoid stack overﬂows. Point-
ers to functions are often used to deﬁne entry points for
tasks and should be avoided elsewhere. Thus prerequi-
site 2 is also covered by coding guidelines. Task entry
functions are accepted because they are known (prereq-
uisite 5). The eRTOS used for the case study provides
special functions for mutexes. Thus mutex accesses can
be modeled separately (prerequisite 3). Prerequisite 4
has been used during case study to simplify the parser
grammar. Violations can be easily detected and an ex-
tension of the grammar is also possible. Prerequisite
5 states that tasks should be known and constantly re-
side in memory. For most embedded systems this is a
general concept, even if some tasks are rarely or never
used.
2.2. Analysis Process
Figure 1 depicts the steps of the analysis process. First
the assembler source code is parsed and results in an
abstract syntax tree (AST). Compared to C-code the
assembler code also exhibits compiler impact, for ex-
ample optimizations. From the AST a call graph is
generated, which exploits dependencies between func-
tions. Thereby possible recursions and unreachable
functions can be efﬁciently identiﬁed. Detailed infor-
mation about dependencies is provided by a control
ﬂow graph, which is extracted from the AST. The con-
trol ﬂow graph subdivides the program into blocks with
different reachability. A colored Petri net is used to ex-
ploit interdependencies between several tasks, which
are not directly available from the control ﬂow graph.
The Petri net is build by connecting the control ﬂow
graphs of several functions. The resulting colored
Petri net is isomorphic to the control ﬂow of original
source code. Now safety and fairness properties can be
checked by applying model checking methods on the
state space of the colored Petri net.
Sourcecode
AST-Set
Callgraph Control-Flow-Graph
Petri Net
Reachability Graph
Fig. 1. Overview: Analysis chain
2.3. Parsing and AST
A parser generated from an EBNF grammar is used to
process assembler source code and generate an abstract
syntax tree. We used reversed engineering to deﬁne
a reduced grammar, which contains reasonable a set
of 16 rules, sufﬁcient to extract the needed informa-
tion and distinguish comments, control ﬂow speciﬁc in-
structions and instructions without affecting the control
ﬂow.
2.4. Call Graph
A call graph is a directed graph in which each node rep-
resents a function f , and each directed arc from f1 to f2
describes f1 is possibly calling f2. The recursion pre-
requisite, see section 2.1, is met, if the graph is acyclic,
which can be decided by depth ﬁrst search.
2.5. Control Flow Graph
The call graph contains only coarse information about
the original program, information about the order or
mutually exclusiveness of function calls is omitted.
The control ﬂow graph is created, by extending the
call graph from section 2.4 with conditional and uncon-
ditional jump instructions. Predicates of conditional
jumps ore omitted. Optionally suitable techniques,
such as data ﬂow analysis may be used [2].
2.5.1. Deﬁnition Control Flow Graph
A control ﬂow graph is deﬁned as 10-Tuple:
GC(B,BS , BR, C, J, JC , P,A, fCA, BIS , BTS)
• B is the set of blocks, whereby a block represents
a set of instructions with equal reachability.
• BS ⊆ B is the set of entry blocks of functions.
• BR ⊆ B is the set of return blocks of functions.
• C ⊆ B ×BS is the set of function calls.
• J ⊆ B ×B is the set of jumps, whereas
C ∩ J = ∅
• JC ⊆ J is the set of conditional jumps.
• A is the set of function arguments, necessary to
model dependencies, like mutual exclusiveness.
• fCA is a surjective mapping from function calls
C to arguments A; fCA : C → A.
• BIS ⊆ BS is the set of starting blocks of used
interrupt functions.
• BTS ⊆ BS is the set of starting blocks of used
task functions.
Some information can be derived from this deﬁni-
tion. BS ∩ BR = ∅ and BI = B − (BS ∪ BR) is
the set of inner blocks. The set E of edges results from
E = C ∪ J . And the set JU of unconditional jumps
can be results from JU = J − JC .
2.5.2. Model Validity
The underlying model requires that for each function
exists exactly one starting block and one return block,
715
such that each function eventually returns.1 This re-
quirement can be stated as integrity of the set E, which
is deﬁned as follows, by valid combinations of block
types and edge types. The ﬁrst three combinations ap-
ply to return blocks, which must not contain uncondi-
tional jumps, while function calls and one conditional
jump are allowed, see equation 1.
∀b1 ∈ BR : |{b2|(b1, b2) ∈ E − JU}| ≤ 1 ∧
|{b2|(b1, b2) ∈ JU}| = 0 (1)
The other three valid combinations apply to non return
blocks BNR = B−BR. A non return block may either
be left by exactly one unconditional jump and option-
ally one unconditional jump or function call, see equa-
tion 2. A valid model satisﬁes both conditions.
∀b1 ∈ BNR : |{b2|(b1, b2) ∈ JU}| = 1 ∧
|{b2|(b1, b2) ∈ JC ∪ C}| ≤ 1 (2)
2.5.3. Initial Activities
Initial activities start from distinct blocks, and can be
divided into interrupts BIS and tasks BTS , whereas
BIS ∩ BTS = ∅. This is necessary, because interrupts
and tasks are conceptually different in this approach.
2.5.4. Reduction
Using information from the call graph and its induc-
tion, unreachable functions can be removed. This is
possible, because function pointers are not allowed, see
prerequisite 2 in section 2.1.
Another reduction can be applied according to crit-
ical functions. Critical functions reside in the operating
system core and are a priori deﬁned. All functions di-
rectly or indirectly calling critical functions are consid-
ered as possibly critical, all other functions are uncriti-
cal. Thus, if only behavior regarding critical functions
is concerned, all uncritical functions can be removed.
2.6. Petri Net
To make statements about the dynamics of the em-
bedded system, we need a standardized representation,
which includes the concurrent behavior. Petri nets al-
low a graphical representation as well as formal anal-
ysis of concurrent tasks. A colored Petri net allows a
conjoint modeling of the system structure and concur-
rent activities. Otherwise (parts of) the structure need
to be replicated for each task, which can be achieved
by deconvolving the colored net.
The universal deﬁnition from [3] is very compre-
hensive and thus not suitable for our purposes. We an-
alyzed typical scenarios and developed a reduced deﬁ-
nition, using the following simpliﬁcations:
1For functions, which are not called, e.g. the main function, the
return block must not be reachable.
• The number of colors equals the number of tasks
plus a neutral color for task interaction.
• The capacity of places is either zero or one for
each color. Each place can contain either neutral
color tokens (capacity is zero for other colors) or
other color tokens (capacity is zero for the neu-
tral color), but not both. No total capacity is de-
ﬁned.
• Arcs don’t contain extra information. The cardi-
nality is always one. Test arcs are permitted.
2.6.1. Deﬁnition Colored Petri Net
The resulting deﬁnition differs from generalized col-
ored Petri nets. A colored Petri net is a bipartite graph
which can be deﬁned as 8-tuple:
PN(P, T,A, PN , AT , C, cN ,m0)
• P is the set of places.
• T is the set of transitions.
• A is the set of arcs, A ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ).
• PN ⊆ P is the set of places holding only the
neutral color. The set of colored places is PC =
P − PN .
• C is the set of colors, which can be contained in
places.
• cN ∈ C is the neutral color. The set C − {cN}
of colors is available for tasks and interrupts.
• m0 is the initial marking of the net. It deﬁnes the
initially available tokens.
2.6.2. Coloring Function
In colored Petri nets a coloring function describes the
consumption and creation of tokens with distinct col-
ors for each transition. For our Petri net class this col-
oring function is implicitly deﬁned, because tasks be-
have equally and interact only by designated mecha-
nisms. The capacities for places in PC are one for each
color but capacity for the neutral color is zero, and vice
versa for places in PN . A transition requires either to
be connected to colored places by at least one pre- and
post-arc, or to neutral places only. During ﬁring of a
transition exactly tokens of one color (plus the neutral
color) are consumed and produced. Thus the coloring
function is properly deﬁned.
2.6.3. Construction of the Petri Net
The Petri net is constructed from the control ﬂow graph
by applying the following rules:
1. Blocks are transformed into places:
B(GC)⇒ P (PN)
2. Jumps are transformed to transitions:
J(GC)⇒ T (PN).
716
3. Function calls are transformed into one waiting
place for the return and two transitions, one to the
starting block and one from the returning block
of the called function.
4. Designated functions, which are used for inter-
action, are described in the following.
2.6.4. Mutual Exclusion
Amutual exclusion (mutex) is a synchronization, which
ensures that a set sequence of instructions does not in-
fer with other tasks. Therefore symmetric functions
,,lock“ and ,,unlock“ are used. The ,,lock“ func-
tion disables all interrupts and consumes a special to-
ken. The unlock function returns this token and en-
ables interrupts. To prevent a deadlock, the functions
,,lock“ and ,,unlock“ must always be used in pairs.
Figure 2(a) shows a mutex place in a colored Petri net
and its deconvolved (uncolored) Petri net in ﬁgure 2(b),
without interrupt enable/disable.
A B
(a) Petri net with 2 colors and mutual exclusion
(b) Uncolored Petri net with mutual exclusion.
Fig. 2. Synchronization using a mutex place
2.6.5. Global Interrupt Enable/Disable
An interrupt service function (ISR) intercepts execu-
tion of the currently running task triggered by an exter-
nal source. This is not allowed during critical sections.
Interrupts can be enabled or disable by designated func-
tions ,,enable GIE“ and ,,disable GIE“. First all
currently running interrupt functions need to be ﬁn-
ished. Figure 3 shows the appropriate Petri nets: While
a token is in pon, all interrupts can be restarted by
ﬁring a restart transition tX rst. If a token arrives
in pdisable begin, the token is removed from pon via
toff and a token is put into poff , and no interrupt
can be restarted. If all running interrupts are ﬁnished,
transition tdisable wait ﬁres and interrupts are disabled.
Activation of interrupts starts by putting a token into
penable begin. Then, after ﬁring ton, pon holds a token
and interrupts are enabled. Finally tenable wait ﬁres and
the function returns.
2.7. Reachability Graph
The Petri net contains information about the dynamics
of concurrently active functions, but is not sufﬁcient for
analysis. Therefore a reachability graph can be used,
which contains all reachable markings of the Petri net,
where a marking contains the coloring of all places in
the Petri net in a certain state. The reachability graph
can be constructed from the Petri net beginning with its
initial marking m0.
2.7.1. Deﬁnition
A reachability graph is a 2-Tuple R(M,S) whereby:
• M is the set of markings, which represents the
vertices of the graph.
• S is the set of directed arcs connecting the ver-
tices, with S ⊆ M ×M .
The most important property is deadlock-freedom.
A deadlock means, the Petri net contains a marking
with no progress2.
∃mD∈M
⎛
⎝ ∨
m∈M−{mD}
(mD,m) /∈ S
⎞
⎠
A deadlock marking either contains no outgoing arc,
or only a marking back to the deadlock marking (self
loop).
The reachability graph is constructed by adding all
reachable markings beginning with m0, and their di-
rectly reachable markings by ﬁring a transition.
2.7.2. Complexity of the Reachability Graph
The state complexity of the reachability graph (number
of markings) of a colored Petri net is EXPSPACE[4].
Given the number of places P and colors C the maxi-
mum number of reachable markings is
|M | ≤ 2|P |∗|C|.
We can give further approximations based on the in-
formation gathered during the analysis. So we can re-
strict a color to the places Pi, which are reachable from
the associated task (or ISR). The maximum number of
markings then results in
|M | ≤ 2
∑ |C|
i=1 (Pi).
In our case each function is modeled by the places Pf ,
in which only one place can be marked per color. Thus
each function adds at most |Pf |+ 1|C| markings. This
results in
|M | ≤
|C|∏
i=1
(
m∏
j=1
(|Pfij |+ 1))
2In contrast to the co-trap deﬁnition for petri nets.
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pon
poff
Apa begin
pa end
ta rst
B pb begin
pb end
tb rst
pdisable begin
pdisable end
tdisable wait
penable begin
penable end
tenable waittoff ton
Fig. 3. Global activation/ deactivation of two interrupts.
markings, where Pfij is the number of places of the j-th
function reachable from task i.
The whole method is sensitive to the number of
model elements (places) necessary to model a function,
to the number of functions and the number of running
tasks. Therefore reduction techniques need to be ap-
plied, which reduce the structure, without affecting an-
alyzed properties, such as deadlock detection, see sec-
tion 2.5.4. Furthermore the structure of the Petri net can
be simpliﬁed by merging places with equivalent reach-
ability properties, according to standard rules, see [5].
3. CASE STUDY
This section explains implementation issues and ob-
tained experimental results.
3.1. Implementation
We implemented the models given in section 2 using
JavaTM. The Parser was created using the parser gener-
ator JavaCC. The other models where created using the
deﬁnitions given in section 2. Erroneous markings can
be interpreted in terms of tasks and functions. Each
state in the reachability graph represents the involved
tasks to execute distinct code sequences. As expected,
the most critical part was the creation of the reachabil-
ity graph, more precisely the realization of markings,
because of its size. So we analyzed several alterna-
tive, preferably small data structures for implementa-
tion. We used integrated data structures with Hash and
Tree based implementation, further called HashMark-
ing and TreeMarking. We also used custom data struc-
tures based on text-encoding PackedMarking and bit-
encoding EnumMarking.
3.2. Experimental Results
Subject of the case study analysis is a custom real time
operating system developed by our department for a
TMS320C6000 digital signal processor [6]. A sample
application used 4 tasks and 4 interrupt functions. With
our implementation, we can easily analyze the assem-
bler source code obtained from the compiler regarding
to deadlock scenarios, after conﬁguring running tasks
and used ISRs.
Altogether we detected 201 functions, of which 73
were not reachable, due to unused device drivers and
deactivated tasks. Another 100 functions could auto-
matically be removed, because they did not interact
with critical functions, e.g. functions for hardware ini-
tializations, which run only during booting. After re-
duction the control ﬂow graph contains 28 functions,
which are relevant for analysis. This is about 7, 1% of
the original functions. The generated Petri net has 317
places, 353 transitions and 829 arcs. After reducing the
Petri net 136 places, 141 transitions and 399 arcs where
left. Without reductions using control ﬂow graph and
Petri net, a large Petri net with 1921 places, 2100 tran-
sitions and 5325 arcs results, which currently would not
be able to be analyzed. So the optimized Petri net (re-
garding to places) is 7% of the unoptimized net.
Table 1 shows the dependencies of the Petri net size
on the number of tasks and reductions. In the unop-
timized Petri net only unreachable functions were re-
moved. The size of the Petri net strongly depends on
the complexity of tasks.
As mentioned in section 2.7.2, the number of tasks
has a major inﬂuence on the size of the reachability
graph, because for each task a color is added, which
is equivalent to replicate a part of the original Petri net.
Table 2 shows the dependency of the size of the reacha-
bility graph on the number of tasks. A number of dead-
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Unoptimized Petri Net Optimized/Reduced Petri Net
Tasks Places Transitions Arcs Places Transitions Arcs
1 77 72 174 36 28 86
2 252 269 641 104 101 293
3 333 371 871 135 140 395
4 334 372 875 136 141 399
Table 1. Petri net complexity depending on task number and reduction
Tasks Markings Edges Duration
1 41 45 <1 sec
2 2733 6397 1 sec
3 292424 1.050.033 70 sec
4 292.424 1.167.105 95 sec
Table 2. Complexity of the reachability graph depend-
ing on number of tasks
lock scenarios where detected, which were ,,false posi-
tives“. The reason was an interrupt deactivation inside
an interrupt. Interrupt deactivation inside an interrupt
is forbidden, because it waits on its own completion,
see section 2.6.5. These scenarios are further removed
in the source code, because of bad coding style.
Some experiments have been made with erroneous
mutex accesses and previous versions of the eRTOS.
These scenarios were correctly recognized during anal-
ysis.
Some experiments were made to determine the in-
ﬂuence of the implementation of markings on memory
usage and runtime, see section 3.1. We used an ex-
ample reachability graph with 140000 markings. The
results are depicted in table 3. It is obvious, that Hash-
Marking needs most runtime and memory, followed by
TreeMarking. Both are outperformed by PackedMark-
ing, and EnumMarking, which are optimized for fast
comparison. While PackedMarking needs slightly less
memory, EnumMarking is faster.
140000 Memory Time
HashMarking 1477 MB 185s
TreeMarking 1060 MB 107s
EnumMarking 167 MB 44s
PackedMarking 154 MB 85s
Table 3. Memory consumption and runtime depending
on marking
4. OUTLOOK AND FUTURE WORK
We presented an approach for automatically verifying
deadlock properties in a multitasking operating system
for embedded systems. The main advantage is its sim-
plicity while connecting small model templates with
automatically derived control ﬂowmodels. So it is easy
to reinterpret analysis results in terms of the original
model. The general ﬁtness of the approach has been
demonstrated using sample scenarios. So far the veriﬁ-
cation back-end has been created straight forward, fur-
ther optimizations, e.g. using compression and BDD-
based veriﬁcation methods are still possible. In future
work a more powerful veriﬁcation tool could be used,
which supports model checking and thus allows check-
ing more complex properties, such as fairness.
The general approach may be extended in two
ways. First, distributed systems may be supported by
using a template for communication, e.g. for con-
necting send- and receive functions of different pro-
cessors. Another extension can be made toward real
time behavior. When approximating runtime of code
sequences, the analysis model may be easily extended
toward timed Petri nets.
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